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POSTCONVICTION PROCEDURE
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr. *
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Standard for Review
Prior to the decision in Jackson v. Virginia,' the Louisiana Supreme
Court reviewed sufficiency of evidence using a no evidence test thought
to have been mandated by the Louisiana constitutional- proscription of
review of facts in criminal cases.' Recognizing that appeals in criminal
cases are permitted on questions of law alone, the court determined that,
when the issue is sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, a ques-
tion of law is presented only when the defendant alleges a total absence
of any factual support for a verdict.' However, before Justice Tate left
the court, he began to use the circumstantial evidence test of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 15:438, which requires that the circumstantial evidence
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence,' in tandem with the
no evidence test, to produce interesting results.
In State v. Lindinger,5 for example, the accused was convicted of driv-
ing while intoxicated based on a showing that he was standing in an in-
toxicated condition next to his truck, which had come to rest in a field
some hundred or so feet from the road. Justice Tate, the author of an
opinion reversing the conviction, said there was no evidence which could
exclude a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The court in State v. Elzie6
took a similar approach to reverse a conviction for possession with intent
to distribute when only a small amount of cocaine was found in the defen-
dant's possession. An earlier symposium article in this Review applauded
the result but criticized the court's methodology and suggested that the
court should simply recognize that sufficiency of evidence is not a ques-
tion of fact but rather is a question of law.' It did not make sense to
say that the appellate courts were constitutionally banned from reviewing
facts in criminal cases, because appellate courts had for some time been
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1. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
2. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(C) (limits the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction in criminal
cases "only to questions of law"). LA. CONST. art. V, § 10(B) (limits appellate jurisdiction
of the court of appeal); see also LA. CONST. of 1921, art. VI1, § 10.
3. See State v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 1294 (La. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 40 (1981); State
v. Baskin, 301 So. 2d 313 (La. 1974); State v. Douglas, 278 So. 2d 485 (La. 1973).
4. LA. R.S. 15:438 provides: "The rule as to circumstantial evidence is: assuming every
fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence."
5. 357 So. 2d 500 (La. 1978).
6. 343 So. 2d 712 (La. 1977).
7. See Joseph, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-
Criminal Trial and Post Conviction Procedure, 38 LA. L. REV. 533, 555-57 (1978).
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reviewing the sufficiency of facts to support a finding of probable cause.
No doubt the issue of probable cause relates to admissibility of evidence
and not to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Nevertheless, the same
principle applies to both the probable cause issue and the sufficiency of
evidence issue: in criminal cases (as in others) some issues of law require
a review of the record to determine whether the factual showing was suf-
ficient to meet a certain legal standard.
Later, in Jackson v. Virginia,8 the United States Supreme Court held
that a reviewing court must determine "whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt." 9 Even after Jackson, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court
seemed unwilling to embrace the standard of review mandated by the Con-
stitution of the United States.'0 Eventually, in State v. Byrd," the court
adopted the Jackson standard and used it to test each element of the
offense for which the verdict was rendered. Thereafter, the court no longer
seemed to doubt that it must employ the Jackson test and abandoned
forever the old no evidence test.
A very interesting development occurred as the court, having adopted
Jackson, began to move beyond the federally mandated review of suffi-
ciency. In a series of cases, the court began to use the circumstantial
evidence test of Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:438 in connection with the
reasonable juror Jackson test to analyze evidentiary sufficiency. In State
v. Williams 2 and State v. Shapiro'3 (opinions by Chief Justice Dixon and
Justice Calogero, respectively), the court (arguably in dicta) announced
that Louisiana has an even more stringent standard for review of suffi-
ciency of evidence than is required by Jackson. ' The authors of the opin-
8. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
9. 443 U.S. at 319. In Jackson, the Court concluded that the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard constitutionally mandated by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment is not satisfied by instructions to the jury that it must be satisfied that the evidence
met that standard. The Court in Jackson announced that the test which reviewing courts
must employ in determining whether the trier of fact had adequate evidence before it is
that a reviewing court must conclude that the prosecution met its constitutionally required
burden of proof.
10. See, e.g., State v. Main Motors, 383 So. 2d 327 (La. 1979).
11. 385 So. 2d 248 (La. 1980).
12. 423 So. 2d 1048 (La. 1982).
13. 431 So. 2d 372 (La. 1983) (on reh'g).
14. In Williams the supreme court, citing LA. R.S. 15:438, said:
The Louisiana legislature has, through this statute, provided greater protection
against erroneous convictions based on circumstantial evidence than is provided
by the Fourteenth Amendment. There is a possibility that the quality of evidence
supporting a conviction would satisfy Jackson v. Virginia, supra, but would not
satisfy the requirement of R.S. 15:438.
In this case there is no direct evidence of any element of the crime charged,
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ions derived this mandate from the statutory formulation of the former
1928 Code of Criminal Procedure which was retained in Louisiana Re-
vised Statutes 15:438. The issue raised by Williams and Shapiro is twofold:
first, whether the statute's standard requiring circumstantial evidence to
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is any different from
the reasonable juror standard of Jackson, and, second, whether the
statute's standard was ever intended as a standard of appellate review.
Justice Dennis' and Justice Lemmon's views, as expressed in State
v. Chism" and State v. Sutton,' 6 question the earlier language of Williams
and Shapiro. In Chism, Justice Dennis noted that there may indeed be
no difference between the standards but that the "excluding every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence" standard may provide a helpful
methodology to assure careful review of sufficiency.' 7 This conclusion may
other than the fact that the crime was committed. We therefore, need not con-
sider whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, could have found the necessary elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the circumstantial evidence must be analyzed
to determine whether it excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
423 So. 2d at 1052. Similarly, in Shapiro, the supreme court said:
Assuming without deciding that the due process clause of the federal constitu-
tion as espoused in Jackson v. Virginia is not offended by a state conviction sup-
ported by the identical evidence in this record, that constitutional consideration
is irrelevant to our disposition of this case. We are constrained in a case of this
sort by Louisiana law of long standing, La.R.S. 15:438, to decide as a. matter
of law whether every reasonable hypothesis of innocence has been excluded, assum-
ing every fact proven that the evidence tends to prove. Upon review, we have
determined that a reasonable hypothesis of innocence has not been excluded in
this case and have concluded that there was insufficient evidence under state law
to support the conviction.
431 So. 2d at 388-89.
15. 436 So. 2d 464 (La. 1983).
16. 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983).
17. In Chism, Justice Dennis wrote:
Although the circumstantial evidence rule may not establish a stricter standard
of review than the more general reasonable juror's reasonable doubt formula,
it emphasizes the need for careful observance of the usual standard, and provides
a helpful methodology for its implementation in cases which hinge on the evalua-
tion of circumstantial evidence.
436 So. 2d at 470. In Sutton, Justice Lemmon wrote in a footnote:
The Jackson standard is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence,
direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. As suggested by Judge Anderson
in a special concurring opinion ih United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 550 (5th
Cir. 1982):
"To say that the evidence is sufficient if 'a reasonable trier of fact could find
that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,' is not substantive-
ly different from saying that the evidence is sufficient if a reasonable trier of
fact could find that the 'evidence was inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis
of innocence.' United States v. Marx, 635 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 1981). It is
true that '[ilt is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis
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be correct. However, it is doubtful that appellate courts will have to face
serious challenges to evidentiary sufficiency except in circumstantial
evidence cases.' 8 Thus, the writer would prefer that the court acknowledge
that the question is simply whether the jury has placed a reasonable con-
struction on the evidence-not whether the appellate court has a reasonable
doubt based on the evidence presented. The opinions in Williams and
Shapiro suggest that the authors may be tempted to retest the evidence
and impose their own views of whether the evidence proved guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt and may fail to afford adequate deference to the jury's
finding on that issue.
Furthermore, "excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence"
is merely a different linguistic formulation of what is essentially the
Jackson test. If the evidence leaves a "reasonable hypothesis of in-
nocence," then a "reasonable juror" must have a reasonable doubt. 9
In Chism, Justice Dennis expressed that the use of the circumstantial
evidence formulation provides a helpful methodology. The writer respect-
fully disagrees. The unadorned Jackson standard provides the best
methodology because it emphasizes the jury's principal role in weighing
the persuasiveness of the state's circumstantial evidence. The reasonable
juror standard reminds the appellate judge that the question is not whether
he would have voted not guilty had the same facts (viewed in a light most
favorable to the state) been presented to him as the trier of fact.
The Williams-Shapiro approach stems from the court's view that Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 15:438 should be utilized as a standard of appellate
review. With deference the writer submits that this view is in error. Follow-
ing the court's decision in State v. Byrd, the Louisiana Legislature, on
recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute, enacted article 821
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The article provides for a post-verdict
judgment of acquittal and clearly manifests an intent to adopt the Jackson
standard as the proper degree of deference which both trial and appellate
courts owe to the jury's verdict. Therefore, even if Louisiana Revised
Statutes 15:438 was initially intended to serve as a standard for a review-
ing court,2" the subsequent enactment of article 821 supersedes that
standard.
of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt,'
but it is equally true that if a hypothesis of innocence is sufficiently reasonable
and sufficiently strong, then a reasonable trier of fact must necessarily entertain
a reasonable doubt about guilt." (Emphasis supplied)
436 So. 2d at 475 n.10.
18. When the evidence is "viewed in a light most favorable" to the state, arguably,
all credibility choices must basically be left with the jury. Conceivably, a credibility choice
by the jury could be so unreasonable that it should not be accepted by an appellate court,
but that question is not yet clearly resolved in the jurisprudence.
19. See Judge Anderson's concurring opinion in United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547,
550 (5th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2398 (1983) quoted in part supra note 16.
20. Since LA. R.S. 15:438 was enacted and initially applied in a pre-Jackson era when
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In conclusion, the writer must express his disagreement with the
beautifully reasoned and thoughtfully articulated special concurrence of
Judge Lanier in State v. Ruple.2 ' Judge Lanier argues that Louisiana ap-
pellate courts cannot review sufficiency claims using the Jackson stan-
dard because the Louisiana Constitution limits review to questions of law
in criminal cases. Judge Lanier argues that Jackson does not require the
state courts to provide a forum for litigating the issue of sufficiency. Under
Judge Lanier's theory, sufficiency claims would have to be presented to
federal courts sitting (as in Jackson itself) to hear the state prisoner's
contention under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.2 The writer's response to Judge
Lanier's position is simply that sufficiency of evidence under the Loui-
siana Constitution can (and must) be treated as a question of law-not
a question of fact. Jackson merely expands the understanding of the cir-
cumstances under which inadequate factual support for the jury's verdict
becomes a reviewable question of law.
Standard for Review in Juvenile Delinquency Cases
In State ex rel. Racine, 3 Judge Lanier did a masterful job of discuss-
ing whether the appellate courts should apply the civil manifest error
standard ' or the criminal Jackson standard when reviewing sufficiency
of evidentiary support for the trial court's adjudication of delinquency,
but he did not resolve the issue because the evidence in Racine met either
test. Although Judge Lanier convincingly revealed the lack of any clear
answer in the jurisprudence, his opinion demonstrates that the appellate
courts ought to apply the Jackson standard rather than the civil standard
of manifest error. Since a delinquency proceeding is essentially criminal
in nature and involves the alleged violation of a criminal statute, there
is little justification for reviewing sufficiency of evidentiary support for
the adjudication of delinquency by means different from those employed
in adult cases in which the verdict is a similar finding of a violation of
a criminal statute. The degree of deference which ought to be accorded
to the fact finder's verdict should be the same in both cases; therefore,
the standard employed ought to be the same.
A more interesting aspect of the case, however, is the manner in which
Judge Lanier's very scholarly opinion may lead the reader to conclude
the no evidence standard was employed, it is very doubtful that the legislature enacting
LA. R.S. 15:438 ever considered this to be a standard for an appellate court to utilize.
It was rather clearly intended only as a standard by which to instruct a trial jury.
21. 426 So. 2d 249, 253 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
22. There is no doubt that sufficiency claims can be raised, as in Jackson itself, in
a petition for post-conviction relief in the United States District Court. See, e.g., Hillie
v. Maggio, 712 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1983); Harris v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1981).
23. 433 So. 2d 243 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
24. See Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1978); Canter v. Koehring, 283
So. 2d 716 (La. 1973).
19831
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that the two standards may be merely different linguistic formulations
not leading to differences in ultimate result. The problem here may be
very similar to the earlier discussion of the Jackson standard versus the
circumstantial evidence standard. The similarity should not be surprising.
Both civil and criminal cases present an obvious need to resolve purely
factual questions at the trial level and to pay great deference to any fac-
tual conclusion for which there is reasonable evidentiary support.
The Insanity Defense
In State v. Gerone,25 the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the evidence presented by the defendant at his bank robbery
trial established an affirmative defense of insanity. The court found that
the trial judge, in returning a verdict of guilty as charged, unreasonably
rejected the defendant's evidence of insanity. Earlier, in State v. Roy,26
the Louisiana Supreme Court formulated a standard modeled on Jackson
by which to test whether the evidence was such that no reasonable juror
could fail to find that the affirmative defense of insanity was established.
However, in Roy, the court simply reversed the jury's guilty verdict and
remanded without giving directions as to what further steps needed to
be taken.
In Gerone, the first circuit in remanding instructed the trial court to
proceed in conformity with article 654 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure-that is, to treat the case as though a verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity was returned and to determine whether the defen-
dant should be committed for treatment or released. Although the man-
date of the first circuit did not specifically order the trial court to enter
a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity, the effect of the court's
instructions appears to be the same.
The result in Gerone differs significantly from that in a case in which
the appellate court orders the defendant discharged or renders a verdict
of guilty of a lesser offense. Unlike the situation in State v. Byrd" (in
which the jury found the elements of the lesser offense), in Gerone, the
appellate court made a finding from the record-a finding which was not
made by the trier of fact.
The writer applauds the result reached by Judge Savoie's opinion in
Gerone and suggests only that future cases clarify the rationale. The fact
that the finding of insanity is made by the appellate court and not by
the trial judge presents an interesting theoretical problem. The trial judge
did find that the state's proof satisfactorily established the defendant's
culpability of the elements of the offense charged. The trial judge simply
improperly rejected the affirmative defense of insanity. Unlike the Byrd
25. 435 So. 2d 1132 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
26. 395 So. 2d 664 (La. 1981).
27. 385 So. 2d 248 (La. 1980).
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situation in which adequately supported findings were left untouched in
the modification of the verdict, here the trial judge made no finding of
insanity. Nevertheless, the defendant's rights are not endangered because
the defendant, not the state, is urging the appellate court to declare the
verdict unreasonable because the trier of fact failed to accept the evidence
of insanity. Therefore, the defendant has no complaint regarding the ap-
pellate court's substituting its judgment for that of the trier of fact.
There is no doubt that appellate courts should, as in Byrd, declare
that they have the inherent authority to adopt such a procedure when
necessary to achieve judicial efficiency and when not prohibited by con-
stitutional or statutory provisions." Clearly, no alternative is satisfactory.
Since the appellate court decided that a rational fact finder must have
found that the evidence established the defendant's insanity, a remand
for a new trial to allow the state further to strengthen its evidence of
defendant's sanity runs contrary to the double jeopardy principles expressed
by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Burks.29 There
the Court denied the government a second chance to strengthen its case
at a retrial after it presented legally insufficient evidence at the first trial.
It would also be inappropriate to remand with directions to retry the case,
giving the jury the possible verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity
and not guilty. Thus, as in Byrd, the appellate court in Gerone faced
a situation requiring it to recognize its inherent authority to modify the
fact finder's verdict in order to protect the rights of the accused as well
as to satisfy the interest of justice.
Responsive Verdicts
Until the plurality opinion in State ex rel. Elaire v. Blackburn,30 there
was no clear jurisprudential guidance for trial courts confronting situa-
tions in which article 814 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
designated an offense to be a proper responsive verdict, but the evidence
presented by the state failed to include proof of the elements of such
offense.
For example, aggravated battery is responsive to an indictment charg-
ing attempted first or second degree murder. However, if the facts show
that the defendant fired a shot at the victim (intending to kill) but missed,
there has been no battery. Earlier, in State v. Dauzat,3 ' the court reversed
the defendant's aggravated battery conviction under circumstances similar
to those described. 2 The answer was simply that the state's proof failed
to establish a battery.
28. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 3.
29. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
30. 424 So. 2d 246 (La. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2432 (1983).
31. 392 So. 2d 393 (La. 1980).
32. Dauzat fired at and missed the victim, but the shot struck the victim's automobile.
On appeal from a conviction of the legislatively provided responsive offense of aggravated
19831
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Elaire reveals the difficulty with the Dauzat approach. Since the ques-
tion of sufficiency of evidence need not be raised in the trial court but
may be raised for the first time on appeal,33 the trial judge under Dauzat
was required to assess sufficiency and decide whether to instruct the jury
as to a legislatively ordained responsive offense.34 The defendant's failure
to object afforded him the opportunity to gain the benefit of a lesser
verdict from the jury, and then to challenge that verdict on appeal. Elaire
seeks to reach a fair balance by requiring the defendant to object to the
instruction on the lesser verdict or permitting the appellate court to review
sufficiency of evidence on the basis of the offense charged, and not on
the basis of the offense on which the responsive verdict was actually
returned.
When this theory is applied to the Dauzat hypothetical earlier posed,
the result is clear. If the defendant chooses to object to the instruction
on the responsive verdict of guilty of aggravated battery, the objection
must be sustained because there is a lack of proof of the battery element.
If the objection is not sustained and an aggravated battery verdict is re-
turned, the conviction will be reversed due to the failure of proof of the
latter, and the defendant must be discharged. On the other hand, if the
defendant fails to object, the case goes to the jury with the option of
returning an aggravated battery verdict. If such a verdict is returned, it
will be sustained on appeal if the evidence was sufficient to sustain a
conviction for attempted second degree murder-the offense charged-
even though the evidence is insufficient to prove aggravated battery. Put
simply, in the no objection situation, the conviction will be affirmed if
the proof was legally sufficient as to the greater (but not found) offense
but legally insufficient as to the unobjected to lesser offense.
In dissent, Justice Dennis correctly noted that convictions will be af-
battery, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the
evidence did not support a finding of the use of force or violence upon the person of the
victim, although the evidence would have supported a conviction of attempted murder.
33. See State v. Raymo, 419 So. 2d 858 (La. 1982); State v. Peoples, 383 So. 2d 1006
(La. 1980).
34. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 814(C), added by 1982 La. Acts, No. 763, § 1. This addi-
tion allows the trial court to refuse to instruct a jury on a statutorily designated responsive
offense if there is no evidence to support such a responsive offense. In Elaire, the court,
noting the use of the no evidence phraseology, said:
Interestingly, the Legislature used the phrase "no evidence", ever [sic] after
the decision in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 . . . (1979), replaced that test
for sufficiency of evidence with a different standard. We need not decide in this
case whether to construe the standard in Article 814 C as fulfilled when the evidence
would be insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a verdict of guilty of the
responsive offense. See the standard used in La.C.Cr.P. Art. 821, providing for
postverdict judgment of acquittal. We note, however, that the 1982 amendment
to Article 814 has the effect of authorizing the trial judge to grant a judgment
of acquittal to responsive verdicts which are not supported by the evidence.
424 So. 2d at 250 n.8.
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firmed under this scheme when the evidence does not meet the Jackson
test as to each element of the offense. What Elaire approves as legitimate
is the jury's power to ignore the evidence and enter a "compromise" ver-
dict. To the extent that the defendant acquiesces in the submission of
the compromise verdict which does not fit the facts, he is bound by that
decision.
Judgment of Acquittal versus New Trial
In Hudson v. Louisiana," the United States Supreme Court made
very clear the principle that double jeopardy precludes retrial of a case
in which the guilty verdict is set aside on the basis of legal insufficiency
of the evidence. In a footnote, the Court recognized that it was not con-
fronted with a situation in which the trial judge (or appellate judge) in
effect sat as a thirteenth juror. 6 In the thirteenth juror situation the judge
decides that he is not satisfied with the state's -case, but cannot find that
a reasonable juror must necessarily have entertained a reasonable doubt.
Such a case presents a different and difficult question as the Court subse-
quently recognized in Tibbs v. Florida,37 which permitted the retrial in
the thirteenth juror situation. An excellent note published in this Review
thoroughly discusses Tibbs and evaluates its impact.38
In the wake of Jackson v. Virginia and Hudson v. Louisiana, the
Louisiana Legislature enacted article 821 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure to provide for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal.39 In enacting
the new statute, the legislature did not amend or repeal article 851(1) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires the trial court to grant
a new trial whenever "the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence."
35. 450 U.S. 40 (1981).
36. In footnote five, the Court said:
Whether a state trial judge in a jury trial may assess evidence as a "13th juror"
is a question of state law. Compare People v. Noga, 196 Colo. 478, 480, 586
P.2d 1002, 1003 (1978); State v. Bowle, 318 So. 2d 407, 408 (Fla. App. 1975),
with Veitch v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 722, 730-731, 152 Cal. Rptr.
822, 827 (1979); People v. Ramos, 33 App.Div.2d 344, 347, 308 N.Y.S.2d 195,
197-198 (1970). Justice Tate's concurring opinion for the Louisiana Supreme Court
suggests that Louisiana law allows trial judges to act as "13th jurors." We do
not decide whether the Double Jeopardy Clause would have barred Louisiana from
retrying petitioner if the trial judge had granted a new trial in that capacity, for
that is not the case before us. We note, however, that Burks precludes retrial
where the State has failed as a matter of law to prove its case despite a fair
opportunity to do so. Supra, at 972. By definition, a new trial ordered by a trial
judge acting as a "13th juror" is not such a case. Thus, nothing in Burks precludes
retrial in such a case.
450 U.S. at 44 n.5.
37. 457 U.S. 31 (1982).
38. See Note, Double Jeopardy: Retrial After Reversal of a Conviction on Evidentiary
Grounds, 43 LA. L. REV. 1061 (1983).
39. See 1982 La. Acts, No. 144, § 1.
19831
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A brief review of the statutory development aids an understanding
of the state of the jurisprudence. In 1975, the judgment of acquittal statute
(article 778 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) was amended to delete
the authority of the trial court to grant a judgment of acquittal in jury
cases. 41 Subsequently, the court recognized the availability of the "ver-
dict contrary to the law and the evidence" ground for new trial as a proper
0 procedural device for asserting the legal insufficiency of evidence." This
development preceded Jackson and arose when the test for legal insuffi-
ciency was decided according to the former no evidence standard.
With the enactment of the post-verdict judgment of acquittal statute,
a clear distinction can now be made between a judgment of acquittal and
the granting of a new trial by a trial judge who is personally dissatisfied
with the weight of the state's evidence, although the verdict is supported
by legally sufficient evidence.' 2
In State v. Korman,'3 in a thoroughly reasoned opinion by Judge
Crain, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the distinc-
tion and remanded a case to the trial court to clarify its ruling by fitting
the case into one category or another. In Korman, the trial judge had
declared that the state's evidence was "insufficient" to support the jury's
manslaughter verdict and ordered a new trial. The court of appeals
remanded the case to the trial judge with directions to grant the new trial
only if the judge was "dissatisfied with the weight of the evidence," and
informed the trial judge that in granting a new trial under the provisions
of article 851 of the Code of Criminal Procedure he must make "a fac-
tual review as a thirteenth juror rather than under the Jackson standard.""
On the other hand, the appellate court instructed the trial judge to grant
a judgment of acquittal under article 821 if he determined that the evidence
was legally insufficient. The court of appeals reminded the trial judge
that the "trial judge cannot act as a thirteenth juror in reviewing a jury
verdict under C.Cr.P. Art. 821, but must review under the much more restric-
tive Jackson standard."' 5
Judge Crain's view is eminently correct. Furthermore, the approach
taken by the court of appeals properly guides trial judges who have been
40. See 1975 La. Acts, No. 527, § 1. For a review of the jurisprudential development
leading to the 1975 amendment, see State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So. 2d 484 (1969),
rev'd, 403 U.S. 946 (Duplessis), cert. dismissed, 403 U.S. 949 (1971) (Hudson) (State v.
Douglas, 278 So. 2d 485, 491 (La. 1973) overruled Hudson "to the extent that it invalidates
the directed verdict article," article 778); State v. Baskin, 301 So. 2d 313 (La. 1974).
41. See State v. May, 339 So. 2d 764 (La. 1976).
42. In State v. Jones, 288 So. 2d 48 (La. 1974), the Louisiana Supreme Court remanded
a case to the trial court with instructions that the judge must decide whether he (the judge)
was satisfied that the state's proof established defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
See also State v. Daspit, 167 La. 53, 118 So. 690 (1928).
43. 439 So. 2d 1099 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
44. Id. at 1101.
45. Id.
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justifiably confused by the concept of a motion for a new trial which
does not really mean a new trial-but rather means an acquittal. Hopefully,
the Korman approach will be followed by the Louisiana Supreme Court
and the other four courts of appeals. Korman provides an excellent discus-
sion of the applicable legal principles and reflects a clear recognition of
the distinction between the trial judge's recognized prerogative to evaluate
the weight of the evidence as a thirteenth juror and his duty to evaluate
the purely legal question of sufficiency under the Jackson standard.
Contemporaneous Objection Rule-Jury Instructions
In State v. Thomas, 6 the Louisiana Supreme Court halted any possi-
ble trend toward broadening the review of unobjected to but erroneous
jury instructions. Like the earlier case of State v. Williamson,"7 Thomas
involved Louisiana homicide statutes which were surrounded by a state
of confusion due to a series of legislative and jurisprudential
developments."8
In Thomas, the jury was given the wrong definition of first degree
murder. The verdict of guilty of first degree murder was not supported
by the evidence; however, the evidence did support a verdict of guilty
of second degree murder. The jury's verdict finding defendant guilty of
the offense of first degree murder was understandable because the trial
judge instructing the jury on first degree murder actually defined second
degree murder. Therefore, on original hearing, the court simply followed
its procedure adopted in State v. Byrd" (and subsequently adopted in
article 821 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure) and reduced
the verdict to guilty of second degree murder, a responsive offense fitting
elements which were found and adequately supported by the record.
In this respect, Thomas is a very simple case, However, the defen-
dant argued that he was entitled to a new trial (not merely a reduction
in the grade of the offense-which incidentally also provided for a man-
datory sentence of life imprisonment) because the jury was incorrectly
instructed as to the essential elements of the offense charged.
In the earlier case of State v. Williamson, the evidence actually did
support the verdict of attempted second degree murder but the jury in-
structions given without objection fundamentally misdefined the offenses.
Although the jury's verdict in Williamson made no sense in view of the
46. 427 So. 2d 428 (La. 1983).
47. 389 So. 2d 1328 (La. 1980).
48. The Louisiana first and second degree murder statutes were amended almost an-
nually during the several years following the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See 1976 La. Acts, No. 657, §§ 1-2; 1977 La. Acts,
No. 121, § 1; 1978 La. Acts, No. 796, § 1; 1979 La. Acts, No. 74, § 1; State v. Payton,
361 So. 2d 866 (La. 1978); State v. Perkins, 375 So. 2d 1179 (La. 1979).
49. 385 So. 2d 248 (La. 1980).
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instructions given, the verdict happened to fit the facts presented under
the actual definition of the responsive offense. In reversing the convic-
tion, the court described the instruction as so fundamentally erroneous
as to offend basic fairness concepts. As Justice Lemmon said, in concur-
rence in Thomas, the verdict in Williamson was "so illogical and inex-
plainable that this court could not affirm the conviction simply because
the jury reached the right result on the wrong instructions.""0
Nevertheless, without overruling Williamson, or even endeavoring to
distinguish Williamson, the majority seemingly has repudiated its rationale.
The court emphasized that Williamson was a unique case and created no
"plain error rule of general application"" even as to fundamentally er-
roneous instructions of the definition of the offense charged.
The writer cannot disagree with Justice Dennis' thorough exposition
of the plain error doctrine as it appears and is applied in the United States
courts-or with his conclusion that the legislature of Louisiana never in-
tended that the appellate courts adopt such an approach in reviewing jury
instructions. The approach here, analogous to that adopted in Elaire, af-
fords proper significance to the contemporaneous objection rule 2 and the
values the rule seeks to advance by requiring counsel to complain of jury
instructions at a time when mistakes can be corrected.
50. 427 So. 2d at 435 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
51. 427 So. 2d at 435; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
52. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 841.
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